Soros e Rubini: diagnósticos sombrios sobre a Europa

Dois nomes conhecidos da finança internacional fazem em dias sucessivos análises semelhantes da (má) situação europeia e da falta de expectativas das políticas atuais.
Primeiro, George Soros, num post entitulado "Reversing Europe’s Renationalization", antecipa tempos difíceis para uma União Europeia ainda incompleta e apela a uma mudança de rumo político, para além das preferencias do Bundesbank:

• The fundamental problems have not been resolved; indeed, the gap between creditor and debtor countries continues to widen. The crisis has entered what may be a less volatile but potentially more lethal phase.
• Whether or not the euro endures, Europe faces a long period of economic stagnation or worse. Other countries have gone through similar experiences. Latin American countries suffered a lost decade after 1982, and Japan has been stagnating for a quarter-century; both have survived. But the European Union is not a country, and it is unlikely to survive. The deflationary debt trap is threatening to destroy a still-incomplete political union.
• The only way to escape the trap is to recognize that current policies are counterproductive and change course.
• The Bundesbank will never accept these proposals, but the European authorities ought to take them seriously. The future of Europe is a political issue, and thus is beyond the Bundesbank’s competence to decide.

Noutro post, entitulado "Europe’s Short Vacation", N. Roubini segue uma linha semelhante, e avisa para a necessidade urgente de um euro menos forte:

• Without a much easier monetary policy and a less front-loaded mode of fiscal austerity, the euro will not weaken, external competitiveness will not be restored, and the recession will deepen. And, without resumption of growth – not years down the line, but in 2012 – the stock and flow imbalances will become even more unsustainable. More eurozone countries will be forced to restructure their debts, and eventually some will decide to exit the monetary union.

Sem um euro mais competitivo, os países mais frágeis da União Europeia apenas podem ver a sua situação dificultada pelas políticas agravar-se:

• Moreover, while über-competitive Germany can withstand a euro at – or even stronger than – $1.30, for the eurozone’s periphery, where unit labor costs rose 30-40% during the last decade, the value of the exchange rate would have to fall to parity with the US dollar to restore competitiveness and external balance. After all, with painful deleveraging – spending less and saving more to reduce debts – depressing domestic private and public demand, the only hope of restoring growth is an improvement in the trade balance, which requires a much weaker euro.

A conclusão de Rubini é que a UE verá agravar-se o clima recessiva.

Mas um euro mais fraco é a última coisa que o Bundesbank e a Alemanha querem ouvir. Uma situação que até lhes convém: na realidade sob a capa do equilibrio orçamental, esconde-se um proteccionismo latente - um euro mais fraco significaria muito mais concorrência para as exportações alemãs. 

(Itálicos da nossa responsabilidade)